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1. As is well known, the assumptions required to establish the 
Second Optimality Theorem are much stronger than those required for 
the First.’ Aside from the non-externality assumptions common to both, 
the only assumption required to establish that a competitive equilibrium is 
a Pareto optimum is that the given competitive equilibrium is a point 
of local nonsatiation for each consumer. But to establish that a given 
Pareto optimum is a competitive equilibrium, convexity assumptions are 
needed to assure that the aggregate supply set and the aggregate “no-worse- 
than” set can be separated by a hyperplane. The present note generalizes 
the Second Optimality Theorem in a very simple way. The assumptions 
of the revised Second Theorem are satisfied in cases where consumption 
externalities make the First Theorem inapplicable. 
2. Notation here follows for the most part that of Debreu [2], 
whose statement of the Second Theorem will now be generalized. Briefly, 
there are m consumers and n producers, Xi is the ith consumer’s consump- 
tion set, completely preordered by 2 Yj, is the jth producer’s production 
I 
set, Y = Z Yj is the total production set. Debreu proves the following 
([2], Theorem 6.4(l), p. 95) : 
Let E be an economy such that: for every i, 
(a) Xi is convex ; 
(b.1) for every xi in Xi, the sets (xi E Xi(xi 2 xi} and {xi E Xi\xi 5 xi> 
I I 
are closed in Xi, 
(b.2) if x! and XT are two points of Xi and if t is a real number, 
0~ t< l,thenx~>xjimpliestx?+(l-t)x!>x!; 
I I 
1 This note was written while the author was visiting professor at the University of 
California, San Diego. An earlier conversation with K. J. Arrow, in which a Remark 
became a Simple Remark, is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 The handy numerical titles are due to K. J. Arrow [I]. 
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(c) Y is convex. 
Given an optimum ((x:), (~7)) where some x” is not a satiation con- 
sumption, there is a price system p different from 0 such that: 
(IX) x* minimizes p *xi on {xi E Xilxi 2 x*}, for every i, 
(/?) yj* maximizes p *yj on Yj, for eve:, j. 
If, in addition, there is for every i an xi E Xi such that paxi < p-x*, 
then ((XT), (~7)) is an equilibrium relative to p. 
Let S = n Xi, the Cartesian product of the consumption sets, with s 
1 
as a typical element. For every consumer i, let there be given a complete 
preordering 5 of S by i. And, as before, let Xi be completely preordered 




and optima relative to preorderings 2 ; both of 
0 
these sets of consumer preorderings induce partial preorderings of S 
according to the Pareto principle. If 
S= (X1,...,Xi-l,Xi,Xj+l,...,X,) 
is an element of S, denote by si the vector s with xi replaced by xi, and by 
s’ the vector (xi,. . . , XL). To Debreu’s assumptions on consumers, add 
the following: 
(b.3) For every s E S, s’ E S, 
0 
xi > xi implies sf > s, 
I I 
and 
xi 2 xi implies si Ls, for k = 1. . . tn. 
1 k 
3. Simple Remark. The above theorem holds when its assumptions 
are amended by inclusion of (b.3) and its conclusion is amended by 
inserting the parenthetical clarification “ relative to g 
( L>> 
” after the 
word “optimum”. 
To establish the validity of this remark, it suffices to note that an 
optimum relative to 
(i> 
g is an optimum relative to 
0 
2 , hence a price 
system sustaining the latter also sustains the former. 3 SAppose, therefore, 
3 Note that the (>) preferences are still the relevant ones for the purpose of defining 
r 
equilibrium relative to a price system. Though each consumer’s satisfaction may depend 
on the consumption of all, each is free to choose only his own. 
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a given attainable state with consumption plans represented by s* E S is 
an optimum relative to i . And suppose, contrary to the assertion 
0 
just made, that there is another attainable state involving consumptions xi, 
which satisfies xi 2 XT for all i, with strict preference holding at least once. 
By changing one consumer’s consumption vector at a time, we transform 
the list s* of consumption vectors into the list s’. At each step, the con- 
sumer whose vector is changed regards himself as no worse off in the 
(i) 
2 
sense, and by assumption (b.3), all consumers concur in considering the 
new list at least as desirable as the old in the sense. Therefore, by 
transitivity, s’ L s* for all i. Any consumer for whom X; > xX; strictly 
prefers s’ to J*, since he enjoys an actual improvement in well 
being in the i sense when his consumption vector is changed. This 
(i> 
implies that s* was not an optimum relative to , a contradiction which 
establishes that s* is an optimum relative to 
(i) 
2 . 
4. Note that the usual statement of the Second Optimality Theorem 
is contained in the amended theorem as the special case in which each 
consumer’s preferences among elements of S actually depend only on 
his own consumption vector, Xi, An easily understood case covered by the 
amended theorem, but not by the original formulation, is that in which 
each consumer’s preferences among elements of S are representable by a 
Bergson welfare function of individualist type, W’(u’(x,), . . . , u*(x,,,)). 
Here, of course, the functions ui represent the own-consumption prefer- 
ences of the various consumers, 2 , 
(i) 
and the functions W’ are monotone 
increasing in all arguments. If this last condition is altered to require 
only that W’ be monotone increasing in zli, and nondecreasing in its 
other arguments, a class of preference structures is characterized which 
includes both the egoistic-individualist and the altruistic-individualist 
extremes. 
The amended theorem points up the fact that there is more scope for 
reliance upon the price mechanism in a community of men of good will 
than in a community of men of ill will-provided that the good will is 
accompanied by respect for each other’s tastes. If I am pleased when 
others become better off, according to their own tastes, I can delegate 
to others the task of deciding how to spend their incomes, and concern 
102 WINTER 
myself only with trying to bring about an equitable distribution of income. 
On the other hand, if I enjoy seeing people suffer, I will be frustrated by 
the “inefficiency” of any system which leaves people free to determine the 
spending of their incomes, however limited. Not content with attempts 
to redistribute income in favor of myself, I will support sumptuary 
legislation to deny to others the consumption of the things they like 
best. 
5. It might be asked whether the inclusion of gifts among the 
possible uses of an individual’s income would make it possible to amend 
the First Optimality Theorem in a similar way. That is, given a com- 
petitive equilibrium in which no individual would prefer to transfer any 
portion of his own income to anyone else, is this situation necessarily a 
Pareto optimum in the 2 
(i> 
sense ?4 The answer is no, as the following 
example illustrates in a rather stark fashion. 
Consider an economy in which all consumers have identical consump- 
tion sets and convex, representable own-consumption preferences, and 
each consumer i has the following preference structure on S: There is 
an indifference curve in the common consumption set which defines the 
boundary of “poverty”, consumption vectors dispreferred to those on 
this indifference curve represent poverty, those on or above it do not. 
Any element in S such that no consumer is in poverty is strictly preferred 
to any element such that at least one consumer is in poverty. Within the 
two subsets “no one in poverty” and “someone in poverty”, consumer 
i’s g preferences simply reflect the standing of his consumption Xi 
according to the commonly held 2 preferences. Clearly, this preference 
system satisfies (b.3). 
If this economy has an attainable state in which no one is in poverty, 
then a Pareto optimum relative to 
(i> 
i can only be a position in which 
no one is in poverty. On the other hand, there may easily be competitive 
equilibria which, in the absence of gifts, would leave some individuals 
in poverty. Does the possibility of gifts make a difference? Only if some 
single individual can, by redistributing his own income, lift everyone out 
of poverty (without going into poverty himself). Otherwise, no single 
individual can improve his situation in any degree by giving any part 
of his income away. 
4 It is assumed here, of course, that (b.3) is satisfied, the economy is otherwise 
externality free, and each consumer is locally nonsatiated in his own consumption set. 
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